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Recent reports suggest that Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix are considering large-scale semiconductor investments in the Honam region. Nothing has been finalized, and companies have every right to evaluate investment opportunities wherever they choose. However, if political pressure and regional development considerations are becoming decisive factors in determining the location of strategic semiconductor facilities, the issue deserves serious scrutiny. The moment a national strategic industry becomes a tool of electoral politics, what is placed at risk is not a single corporation but the future of the Republic of Korea itself.
In many manufacturing sectors, South Korea is already facing intense competition from China. Industries such as steel, petrochemicals, consumer electronics, automobiles, and shipbuilding have seen their competitive advantages steadily erode. In this environment, semiconductors remain one of the few sectors in which South Korea continues to maintain a clear global edge. If semiconductors falter, the consequences will extend far beyond individual companies. The foundation of the entire Korean economy could be shaken. Semiconductors are no longer merely an industry; they are a national lifeline.
I do not view this issue solely through the lens of industrial policy. From 2008 to 2011, I served as Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai, overseeing Jiangsu Province, home to China’s most important semiconductor hubs, including Suzhou and Wuxi. Samsung Electronics operated major semiconductor facilities in Suzhou, while SK Hynix maintained significant operations in Wuxi. During that period, I met countless Chinese officials, including city mayors, provincial governors, and central government policymakers. Through those experiences, I witnessed firsthand that semiconductors were regarded not merely as a business sector but as a matter of national strategy.
China, despite being a communist state, approached semiconductors as a national survival industry. The central government, local governments, financial institutions, universities, and research institutes functioned as an integrated ecosystem dedicated to strengthening industrial competitiveness. Their objective was straightforward: grow companies, expand industrial capacity, and translate those gains into national power. It was no coincidence that then-President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao frequently included semiconductor facilities among their most important inspection sites. Chinese leaders understood that semiconductors were not simply another manufacturing sector; they were central to technological sovereignty and industrial dominance.
One memory remains particularly vivid. I recall the extensive diplomatic and political coordination required before Samsung’s Lee Jae-yong was able to meet Xi Jinping, who was then Vice President and widely regarded as China’s future leader. That brief meeting was not merely a corporate courtesy call. It was part of a much larger effort concerning the future of South Korea’s semiconductor industry and economic diplomacy.
Watching those developments unfold, I came to a clear conclusion: semiconductors are not simply a corporate matter. They sit at the intersection of diplomacy, national security, industrial policy, and state strategy. Their location should therefore be determined by industrial logic, not political calculations.
No major country determines the location of semiconductor facilities based on electoral considerations. Micron selected Syracuse of New York because it met critical industrial requirements. TSMC established major production facilities in Kaohsiung, Phoenix of Arizona, and Kumamoto based on infrastructure, talent, supply-chain integration, and strategic considerations. Samsung’s advanced foundry investment in Taylor, Texas followed the same logic. These decisions were driven by power availability, water resources, logistics, universities, research institutions, and supplier ecosystems—not by political balancing.
South Korea is no different. The semiconductor belt stretching from Yongin to Hwaseong and Pyeongtaek did not emerge overnight. It is the product of more than four decades of accumulated investment in research talent, equipment manufacturers, materials suppliers, transportation networks, power grids, and water infrastructure. The semiconductor industry is not a collection of isolated factories. It is a vast ecosystem. Ecosystems cannot be replicated by administrative decree.
Equally concerning is the perception surrounding recent decision-making processes. According to media reports, discussions regarding large-scale regional semiconductor investments gained momentum following a series of meetings between President Lee Jae-myung and major business leaders. Corporate investment decisions are naturally influenced by many factors, and the final judgment belongs to the companies themselves. Nevertheless, if strategic investment decisions appear to be shaped primarily by political consultations rather than market analysis and industrial fundamentals, concerns about policy predictability inevitably arise.
Global semiconductor investments worth hundreds of billions of dollars are typically based on years of feasibility studies, workforce assessments, infrastructure evaluations, and supply-chain analyses. If investment directions seem to shift dramatically following meetings with political leaders, domestic and international investors may question the consistency and predictability of Korea’s business environment. Markets evaluate not only policy outcomes but also the processes through which those policies are made.
The broader issue concerns the evolving relationship between political power and corporate decision-making. In a market economy, major investments should be driven by profitability, competitiveness, workforce availability, and infrastructure considerations. If companies increasingly appear to be aligning their investment decisions with political expectations, observers may conclude that political influence is outweighing business judgment. The problem is not any single corporate decision. The problem is the perception that strategic industrial investments can be shaped by political pressure. Once that perception takes hold, one of Korea’s greatest economic assets—market credibility—begins to erode.
Companies naturally seek the most competitive locations for investment. Yet if businesses appear to have little practical choice when confronted with political demands, that raises broader concerns about the principles of a free-market economy. Governments should support strategic industries and create favorable conditions for growth. They should not become the de facto decision-makers in corporate investment planning.
Regional development is important. However, regional development should not override industrial logic. If the Honam region requires stronger economic growth, policymakers should identify industries that match the region’s comparative advantages. Artificial intelligence infrastructure, renewable energy, advanced batteries, agricultural biotechnology, and advanced materials all offer promising opportunities. In semiconductors, a phased strategy focusing on advanced packaging, semiconductor materials and equipment, R&D facilities, and workforce development would be far more realistic. Attempting to relocate core semiconductor production hubs for political reasons is an entirely different matter.
What is most troubling is the growing perception that strategic industries are becoming instruments of electoral politics. If the location of national industries is redesigned primarily to appeal to regional voters, that is not industrial policy—it is political engineering. The success of South Korea’s semiconductor industry benefits the entire nation, not a particular province or voting bloc.
Even the Chinese Communist Party approaches industrial policy with cold strategic discipline. It focuses on helping firms grow, strengthening industrial ecosystems, and expanding the nation’s overall economic capacity. During my years in Shanghai, I witnessed this approach firsthand. The priority was always to grow the pie before discussing how to divide it. By contrast, attempting to reorganize established industrial ecosystems for political purposes risks weakening rather than strengthening national competitiveness.
The role of a national leader is not to pressure corporations into making politically desirable investments. It is to create an environment in which those companies can defeat global competitors and expand national prosperity. When strategic industries become tools of political calculation, what is ultimately sacrificed is not corporate profit but the country’s economic future.
Politics may follow votes. National strategy must not.
Today, the United States, China, Japan, and Taiwan are engaged in an intense global competition for semiconductor leadership. South Korea’s responsibility is not to politicize its semiconductor industry but to ensure that it remains among the most competitive in the world.
If the Lee Jae-myung administration genuinely seeks balanced national development, it should focus on strengthening each region’s unique industrial advantages rather than turning semiconductors into political symbols. Strategic industries are not instruments of electoral engineering. They are the foundation of national survival.
Semiconductors cannot be relocated by votes. An industry that moves at the command of political power ceases to be a strategic industry and becomes a state-directed one. And when semiconductors are destabilized, what is ultimately placed at risk is not a single region, but the future of South Korea itself.
jeongkeekim@naver.com
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